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1.1.  The transitional VAT arrangl~mcnts 
In order to achieve the removal of border controls tor tax  purposes inside the Community 
from  1.1.1993,  the  Council  decided  in  1991  to  establish  the  transitional  VAT 
arrangements!.  These  arrangements  provide  that  intra-Community  operations  between 
taxable persons continue to  be  taxed  at  the  rate  and  conditions of the  Member  State of 
destination.  An  exemption for supplies of goods destined  for  another Member State was 
introduced  to  replace the  exemption  tor exports and  the  taxable  event  of "importation" 
was replaced by "acquisition" in the Member State of arrival of  the goods. 
Detailed  information  on  the  functioning  of the  transitional  VAT  arrangements  can  be 
found  in  the repo11  fi·om  the Commission to  the Council  and  the  European Parliament on 
the  operation  of the  transitional  arrangements  for  charging  VAT  in  intra-Community 
trade~. 
1.2.  The control implications of the transitional VAT arrangements 
Betore  I  January  1993,  cross-border  trade  in  goods  between  ta:-.:able  persons  in  the 
Community was controlled  by  checks  at  national  tl·ontiers  on  documents  accompanying 
the physical movement of the goods. Abolishing border controls resulted  in  the integration 
of the control of taxation of intra-Community trade into domestic VAT control. 
The  demands  of VAT  control  and  the  challenge  presented  by  the  abolition  of border 
controls  required  cooperation  between  l'vlember  States  on  a  new  scale.  In  particular, 
Member  States  needed  information  from  other  l'vlember  States  in  order  to  be  able  to 
control the tax.  These needs were: 
•  To  be  able  to  obtain  intormation  on  all  intra-Community  transactions  made  between 
traders on  their own VAT identitication register and  those identitied  in  other Member 
States. 
•  To be able to contirm the validity of a VAT identitication number nf the purchaser. 
These  data,  which  form  an  input  into  Member  States'  methodology  to  control  VAT  on 
intra-Community  transactions,  arc  provided  by  the  VAT  Information  Exchange  System 
(VIES) which is a common computer network. 
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3 1.3.  The Community legal framcworl' for  administrativl~ roolH'ration 
Council Regulation (EEC) No  21 S/92-'  concerns administrative cooperation in  the tield  of 
indirect taxation (VAT). It  provides the legal ti·amework which obliges the Member States 
to  provide  to  one  another  the  information  necessary  for  controlling  VAT  on  intra-
Community trade; it  is  designed  to  complement the  provisions of Directive  77/799/EEC~ 
(on mutual ass.istance between Member States in  the field  of direct and  indirect taxation). 
The  Regulation  also  provides  Member States  with  the  right  to  obtain  the  information 
regularly in  aggregated form,  as  well  as  to  obtain supplementary detailed  information on 
request. Directive 76/308/EEC provides for mutual assistance between Member States in 
the recovery of. inter alia.  VAT claims owing to national  administrations~. 
The Standing Comm.ittee on Administrative Cooperation in  the  field  of Indirect Taxation 
(SCAC) was set up  under Ar1icle  I  0 of the Regulation. The SCAC, managed and  chaired 
by  the Commission.  is  responsible for  keeping a continuous \Vatch  on  the development of 
administrative cooperation and  mutual assistance.  It  also  monitors the  performance of the 
Member States in  the collection. exchange and  exploitation of the  data.  At  Member State 
level.  the day to  day operation of the  arrangements  is  overseen  by a network  of Central 
Liaison Otlices (CLOs). 
Article  II  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  21 'i!./92  requires  that  "i\lember  States  and  the 
Commission  shall  examine  and  evaluate  the  operation  of  the  arrangements  for 
administrative  cooperation  provided  for  in  this  Regulation  ... ".  L}nder  .·\rticle  II,  the 
Con1111ission  is  also  responsible  for  pooling  i\ le111ber  States·  e:\perience  concerning  ne\v 
means of tax evasion and avoidance. 
Ar1icle  14  requires  that  "Every  two  ~'cars  alier  the  date  of entry  into  force  of this 
Regulation.  the Commission shall  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on 
the  conditions  of application  of this  Regulation  on  the  basis.  in  particular  ..  nf  the 
continuous monitoring procedures provided fo.r  in  Article  I I " 
The first  repon under Article  14 of Regul<llion  (EEC) ;\u 21 S/92  which  wa .  ..;  published on 
23  June  1994C·  outlined  the  new  admini~trative  ti·<tttlc\\ orl  ''  hich  was  put  in  plncc 
following the removal of border controls for  VAT' purposes and  reported on  its successful 
implementation.  This second  report  describes  the  development  of the  <uTangements  since 
1993, evaluates their etrecti\'cness and  mal-;es  rect)JtlJllendatiuns f(lr  impro\ cmcnts. 
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12-1). 2.  I>EVELOP!\1ENTS IN ADI\11NISTRATIVE COOPERATION DURING  1994  AND  1995: 
AN EVALUATION 
2.1.  Community developments 
2. /. /.  The  /Y95 enk11xement 
One of the  main  tasks  facing  the  SCAC  and  its  Technical  Sub-Committee during  1994 
was  to  prepare  for  enlargement  of the  Community  on  I  January  1995.  The  acceding 
Member States and  the Community  had  to  prepare to  ensure that  the  transitional  VAT 
arrangements  for  intra-Community  trade  could  be  properly  applied  from  the  date  of 
accession. This task principally fell  to the new  Member States themselves,  but the SCAC 
still  had  to ensure that Austria, Finland and  Sweden were connected to the VIES network 
and the system was adapted for the enlarged Community. 
The  VIES  was successfully  made  available  for  testing by  the  three  new  Member States 
and  the  Community  of  12  from  the  first  week  of December  1994,  and  was  fully 
operational for the Community of 15  tl·om  I .January  19Q5. 
2.1. 2.  Anti-riwul11w11as 
In  1992,  the  SCAC  had  set  up  an  Anti-Fraud  Sub-Committee  whose  purpose  was  "to 
examine  the  existing  legislative,  administrative  and  technical  arrangements  - already  in 
existence  and/or  in  the  course  of cle,·elopment  within  the  Community  - for  anti-ti·aucl 
activity in  the field  of indirect taxation." At  the  time.  the  Commission  had  recommended 
that  the  Member States adopt  a more strategic and  operational  programme for  the  fight 
against  ti·aud,  but  this  was  rejected  by  some  l\1ember  States.  During  1994  the  Sub-
Committee  met  only  twice  and  it  did  not  meet  at  all  during  1995.  The  activity  at  its 
meeting in  December  199'-1  was limited to  cases of VAT fi·aud,  provided by a few  Member· 
States. 
In  practice,  the  work  of the  Sub-committee  in  its  early  years  concentrated  on  the 
installation of a computerised  network (Fiscal  SCENT) in  the  Member States and  on  the 
training of national otlicials in  its  usc.  Although  all  Member States are  now connected to 
the network and despite the training of·onicials. it  is clear that  '~'ith a few exceptions, very 
little  usc  is  made  of the  network  for  the  communication  of messages  between  Member 
States.  This suggests that  the  full  potential  of the  system  is  not  being  exploited.  This  is 
particularly  worrying  as  the  purpose  of the  fiscal  SCENT  was  to  t:1cilitate  rapid  and 
secure  contacts  between  national  services  dealing  with  VAT  fi'curd.  In  1996,  the 
Commission has relaunched its efforts to demonstrate the advantages ofthe system. 
This  lack  of common  activity  in  the  fight  against  fi·aud  on  a  Comrmrnity  level  is 
regrettable.  It  stems partly fi·om  the  limited  terms of reference initially  given  to  the  Sub-
Committee  by  the  Member  States,  which  fell  well  short  of trying  to  formulate  a 
Community  strategy  for  the  tight  ag<linst  fraud.  In  addition,  the  reluctance  of some 
Member  States  to  cooperate  with  one  another  on  a  multilateral  basis  in  investigating 
suspected  fi·aud  also  hampered  the  Community's  ability  to  develop  a  coherent  strategy. 
The  Commission  accordingly  encountered  problems  in  meeting  its  responsibility  under 
Article  II  of Regulation (EEC) No  21  ~/92 to  pool  l'vlcmber States' experience concerning 
new means of tax avoidance and  evasion. 
5 However the SCAC has,  during  1996, adopted the Commission's proposed new terms of 
reference for  the  Sub-Committee with  the  a·im  of encouraging and  facilitating  a greater 
coordination  of Member  States'  efforts  and  resources  in  the  tight  against  fraud.  The 
relaunched  Sub-Committee has  adopted  an  ambitious  work  programme:  to  identify  the 
aspects of the indirect tax system most sensitive to fraud;  to evaluate the ·functioning and 
adequacy of the arrangements in  place to  tackle fraud  and  to maximise their effective use. 
For this  work programme to  succeed, all  Member States will  need  to  commit themselves 
to  the exchange of information based  on  concrete investigation case  studies.  Only  a real 
willingness  to  pool  information  will  permit  the  development  of a  Community  strategy, 
which  is  essential  for  the  proper  tl.mctionii1g  of the  internal  market,  to  deal  with  VAT 
fraud. 
The Commission  has been  informed  on  an  ad hoc basis  of cases which  concern revenue 
loss ofbetween 2 and  60 million  ECU.  It  is  clear ti·om  such cases that a need  exists for a 
close coordination of  the etTorts of the national authorities in  complex transnational cases. 
The assistance which  the Commission  can  provide  in  coordinating Community  action  in 
this area is hampered by the lack of a sutliciently broad legal basis such as already exists in 
the fields ofCustoms and  Agriculture. 
2.1. 3.  A1ultilataal 1  'A r C.:()/1/f'()/  L'.\"jJC.:I'illiL'/1/S 
Companies  trading  in  several  Member  States  arc  normally  treated  as  separate  national 
entities for  the  purposes of VAT  control.  The Commission  and  Member  States became 
concerned in  \994 that  multinational  companies were capable of exploiting any  apparent 
ditTcrenccs  in  treatment  by  Member  States'  tax  administrations  to  the  detriment  of fair 
competition  and  overall  control.  As  multinational  traders  are  responsible  for  large 
amounts  of VAT,  Member  States  need  to  g1ve  a  high  priority  to  the  control  of these 
traders. 
In  1994  and  1995  the  SCAC  launched  experiments,  using  Directive  77/799/EEC  as  its 
principal  legal  basis,  with  financial  support  tl·om  the  Community,  on  the joint control of 
multinational companies. 
The objective of  the  experim~nts was to test  the etfectivcness of the tools provided by  the 
Community  legislative  framework  for  administrative  cooperation  in  controlling 
multinational  enterprises.  The  experiments also  provided  an  opportunity to  compare the 
difTerent control methods in the lvlember States. 
G Certain Member States did  not  part1c1pillc  in  the  e:xpcrimcnts.  for  a  number of reasons. 
Some  preferred  bilateral  rather  than  multilateral  VAT  control  and  some  felt  that  they 
could  not  participate  because  of the  involvement  of the  Commission.  The  national 
legislation  of some  Member  States  inhibited  their  particip;qion.  notwithstanding  that 
Community legislation permits such activities. 
As a result of the coordinated controls, those Member States that did  participate reported 
that they had obtained a more complete knowledge and  understanding of the activities of. 
the traders controlled. Trade practices designed  purely to  maximise tax advantages were 
discovered.  Indeed some administrations discovered activities  of the  traders which  were 
previously completely unknown to  them.  The controls also  confirmed  that  traders were 
exploiting  the  complexity  and  ambiguity  of the  transitional  VAT  arrangements  and  the 
ditTerent interpretations permitted to Member States. 
The  results of the experiments showed that  the  tools  provided  by  the  Community  legal 
framework  can  be  used  to  improve  the  control  of multinational  traders.  They  also, 
however,  highlighted  a  number  e:f  legal  and  practical  impediments  to  fully  effective 
cooperation  in  the  control  of these  comple:x.  but  not  unusual.  trading  activities.  The 
SCAC adopted a first  set of  general guidelines to  be  f()llowed  tor future multilateral VAT 
controls. 
The Commission  will,  in  the  short  term,  continue  to  fund  some  e:xperiments,  to  further 
demonstrate the  necessity  of multilateral,  rather  than  national  or bilateral  VAT  control. 
and  to  refine  the  guidelines  already  issued.  Despite  the  evident  success  of the  two 
experiments, however, Member States have vet  to undertake such  multilateral controls on 
their own initiati,·e as  part of their  da~· to  da~· contrul 
The  Commission  believes  that.  to  meet  the  challenges  posed  b~,  such  traders,  these 
controls  should  become  a  common  part  of national  control  strategies.  In  addition.  the 
Commission  believes  that  those  :'dember  States  who  lww  not  taken  part  in  the 
experimt;nts to date should do so as soon as  possible. 
::.1. -1.  Afuuwlussistulln' o11 re(·m·t'J:r 
It  has  been  clear  for  some  time  that  there  were  shortcomings  in  the  functioning  of 
cooperation under Directive  7()/.)08/EEC which  provide~ 1<.1r  mutual  assi~tance between 
Member States in  the reCO\'Cl)' of VAT claims.  The number of claims  f<.1r  which assistance 
is  requested  is  ,·ery  small  and  ;\!ember  States  acknowledge  th:ll  the  success  rate  in 
recovering the olten signilicant amounts of ta:x  outstanding are well  beiO\v what should be 
expected. The Commission,  with  the  help  of the Member States.  undertook an  extensive 
analysis ofthe causes ofthese problems. The results of the ConlllllSSion's analysis, broadly 
cnclnrsecl by the SCAC, identified tive main  titctnrs behind the slwrtcon1ings: 
7 •  wide divergence between l'vlember States' national recovery powers: 
•  lack of  equal legal treatment between inter-Member State claims and domestic claims: 
•  low priority given to recovering claims for other Member States. 
•  slow, complicated and poorly understood mutual assistance arrangements and; 
•  the sheer difficulty of  tracing some debtors: 
The Commission  will  make  proposals  in  early  1997  to  improve  the  functioning  of the 
Directive.  This  will  also  have  to  be  backed  up  by  a  sustained  etlort  fl·om  the  Member 
States both to make greater use of the Directive and  to give higher priority to responding 
to requests made under it. 
2.2.  Administrative cooperation at  l\lcmhrr State lcvd 
The purpose of the Community arrangements for  administrative cooperation put  in  place 
by Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 is  to avoid tax  revenue losses for  Member States. Article 
4(2) of the Regulntion provides information on  request to a l'vlember  State about whether 
one of its traders has made intra-Community purchases during a particular quarter. Article 
4(3) of the Regulation identities the suppliers ti-om  which the purchases have been made. 
The  aggregated  form  of Article  4{1)  data  is  also  exchanged  automatically  between 
Member States at  the end  of each quarter by  the  VIES.  f\1ember  States can  also,  under 
A11icle  S of the  Regulation  and  Article  1 of Directive  77/799/EEC,  make  more  specific 
requests  for  information,  fi.)r  the  purpose  of control  of particular  traders.  relating  for 
example to  the  invoice  numbers,  dates and  values of individual  transactions.  The  usc  of 
Articles 4(2), 4(3) and  S of the  Regulation by  1\1cmber States are the key  elements in  the 
control oftraders engaged in  intra-Community trade. 
At  the time of the adoption of the transitional VAT arrangements, the Community did  not 
lay  down  any  particular  single  control  methodology  or  method  of exploiting  the  VIES 
data and  other opportunities to gather information.  Each  Member State retained the right 
to  control  its  own  traders  in  the  way  which  it  deemed  aj1propriate.  Nevertheless,  the 
Community has,  in  the context  of the  Matthneus-Tax  programme7,  t()stcred  a debate on 
the  methodology  of control  of intra-Community  trade  The  programme  hns  provided 
opportunities for  Member States to  compare approaches  to  V  t\  T  control  generally  and 
the  intra-Community  trade  and  the  use  of the  VIES  in  particuiar  and  to  identit)'  best 
practice. 
7  0.1  No  L 2l'O.  1:'.  II. I ')'J:\.  p.  27.  Fmtllcr dcl;lils or I  he progr;lllllllC can be round  in  the Collllllission 
reports to the Council and the European P;lrli;llllCilt  (COI\l('JS) (,(,.\  lin:lll a11d  CO~ll%)  S-U  linal). 
8 Early in  1993, in  an etTort  to evaluate the effectiveness of the use to which the VIES data 
is  put,  the  Commission  asked  Member  States  to  provide  details  of additional  tax 
discovered  because  of the  information  exchanged  over  the  VIES.  At  the  time,  most 
Member States were unwilling  (or unable)  to  provide  this  information,  though  they  did 
agree to  report  to  the  Commission  the  number of cases  in  which  furthe'r  control  action· 
was  taken  arising  from  information  exchanged  over  the  VIES;  neve11heless  even  now, 
only  two  or  three  Member  States  regularly  provide  this  information.  Accordingly,  the 
Commission  can  only  evaluate  the  Member  States'  exploitation  of the  administrative 
cooperation  framework  by  examining  their  use  of its  key  elements  which  consist  of 
requests  made  under  Article  5  of the  Regulation  and  Article  2  of the  Directive,  and 
enquiries made under Articles 4(2) and 4(3) ofthe Regulation. 
Figure 1:  Number of •·equests madl~ per quarter during 1994 and 1995 unde1· Article 
5 of Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 and Article 2 of Directive 77179.9/EEC 
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Figure  I  above  indicates  a  gradual  increase  in  the  usc  of requests  for  information  by 
Member States. However.· the number of requests which  have been made is only a fraction 
of the  tens  of thousands  of requests  per  annun1  which  l'vlcmber  States  themselves 
estimated in June  1993. 
Figure 2 below analyses the number of req11ests made by each Member State. 
9 Figure 2:  Number of requests pe•· Member State made during 1994 and  1995 undc•· 
Article 5 of the Rt~gulation and Article 2 of the Directive 
The overall growth in  the number of Article 5 requests with  marked  differences between 
Member States is mirrored in  the increase in  enquiries under Article 4,  as can be seen from 
figure 3 below.  As  a prerequisite to  making a request  U11Cier  Article 5 of the  Regulntion, 
Member States must first use the possibilities provided by Article -l 
Figure 3:  Owrall growth during 199-t  and  1995 in  the numlll·r of l'nquiries made 
under Articles 4(2) and 4(3) of the Rt•gulation. 
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The overall  picture for  the  steady  development  of administrative  cooperation  shmvn  in 
figures  I and 3 is  to be welcomed. The steady growth in  the use of the VIES  f~1cilities and 
the gradual increase in  the number of Article 5 and  Article 2 requests retlects the growing 
importance of  administrative cooperation in  the control of intra-Community trade.  But, as 
figures  4 and  5 below demonstr;lte,  this  overall growth masks sharp dit1erences between 
Member States in  their use of  the Article 4(2) and  Article 4(3) instruments. 
10 Figure 4: Number· of enquiries made hy each Memhcr State during 1994 and 1995 
under Articles 4(2) and 4(3) of the Regulation per· trader in that Member State 
maldng intnt-Comnwnity supplies. 
Many ofthc requests made under Article 4 ofthc Regulation arc made to confirm that the 
trader in  the  requesting  Member  State did  not  make  any  intra-Community  acquisitions. 
This is also a valid method of exploiting the VIES data.  Figure 5 below indicates Member 
States' use  of Article 4(3) of the  Regulation  to  control  tho~e traders  making  purchases 
ti·om  other Member States. 
Figure 5: Numhcr of enquiries made hy earh i\'lcmher State during 1994 and 1995 
under Artidc 4(3) ofR(•gulation (EEC) No  21S/92, per tr·ader·making intnt-
Community purchases in  that 1\lemher State. 
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The conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  tl·om  ligures  I to  5 above  is  that,  while  the  usc  of the 
administrative cooperation arrangements is  certainly increasing,  its  usc  is  not  sut1icient to 
control intra-Community trade adequately in  all  l'vlemhcr States. The low usc of the VIES 
facilities  in  some  Member States  may  be  attributed  to  a  number of factors.  Clearly  the 
extent  to  \vhich  control  o!licials  have  access  to  the  system  i~  important.  Although  the 
11 VIES  data  is  potentially  accessible  through  more  than  55.000  terminals  within  the 
Community,  some Member  States allow  only  limited  access  to  their otlicials.  This  also 
tends  to  explain  the corresponding  low  usc  of the  fi1cilities  offered  by  Article  5  of the 
Regulation and Article 2 of the Directive. 
Based on the evidence ofthe use of the VIES and the best practice that has emerged from 
the Matthaeus-Tax programme, the Commission believes that the most  etl~ctive approach 
to  VAT  control  is  an  integrated  one,  using  the  VIES  data  as  one  input  among others. 
Firstly,  by  using  the  automatically  exchanged  data  to  inform  risk  analysis  designed  to 
identify  the  traders  or  categories  of traders  to  be  controlled.  Secondly,  by  making 
enquiries  under  A11icle  4  of the  Regulation  as  part  of the  information  gathering  effort 
prior to  or following  a control of a specific trader.  And  finally,  to  use the provisions of 
Article 5 to obtain information on specific transactions. 
A high standard of VAT control requires the use of administrative cooperation to be more 
widespread in  the Member States and thoroughly integrated into national control strategy. 
Administrative cooperation should not  be a specialist function.  Those Member States who 
do not allow their ordinary control otlicials access to  the  enquiries facilities of the  VIES 
should  do  so.  Information  about  the  intra-Community  purchases  of a  trader  should  be 
seen as  another piece of the national control jigsaw, without which control is  incomplete. 
This  approach  entails  extensive  use  by  ordinary  VAT  control  otlicials  of the  specific 
enquiry  and  request  oppo11unities  provided  by  the  Community.  Figures  3  to  5  clearly 
show  that  certain  Member  States  h<we  followed  this  approach  a  great  deal  more  than 
others.  Those Member States which  nnke little use  of the  opportunities provided  by  the 
tools of  administrative cooperation can nc.t  have such a complete picture of  their traders. 
Member States still  have  much  to  do  to  make  admini::;trative  cooperation  more  widely 
knO\vn within their administrations.  Even  in  those l\1ember States \Vhere use of the system 
is well  established, it  is still  not  uncommon to find  national otlicials in  l'dember States who 
are  unaware  of the  opportunities  to  request  information  fi·om  other i\lember  States,  to 
help  them deal with particular problems they encounter either during routine VAT control 
or in  the course of anti-fi·aud  activities.  Extensive training is  dear!~' needed in  the usc and 
exploitation ofthc VIES data and other cooperation opportunities. 
The  Community  also  lws  a  role  to  play  in  making  national.  ot1icials  aware  of the 
Community  dimension  of their  work.  fostering  mutual  contidence  between  ot1icials  of 
ditTercnt  national  administrations  and  making  cooperation  as  user-fl·iendly  and  low  in 
opportunity cost as  possible. This means equipping them  with  the skills and  infi·astructure 
needed to cooperate and encouraging a habit of doing so. 
12 Low  use  of the  instruments  of cooperation  rarses  serious  questions  about  the  overall 
credibility and etTectiveness of some Member States' control of VAT on  intra-Community 
trade.  The  establishment  of the  VIES  and  Regulation  (EEC)  No  218/92  (adopted  by 
unanimity)  were  originally  seen  by  all  the  Member  States  as  essential  to  the  effective 
control  under  the  transitional  VAT  arrangements.  The  setting  up  and  running  of the 
infrastnrcture has  required  significant  investment  fi·om  the  Community  a.nd  the  Member 
States  in  terms  of human  and  financial  resources  and  the  obligations  on  traders  to  file 
quarterly recapitulative statements imposes a considerable burden on them. 
2. 2. 2.  !vfemher States' mlu in col/ucting data 
Under A11icle  4 of Regulation (EEC) No  218/92, Member States "shall  ensure that their 
data bases are kept  up  to date,  complete and  accurate".  The Commission  has  constantly 
pressed the Member States,  in  the  SCAC  and  in  the  periodic  meetings  of the  Heads  of 
national Central Liaison Otlices (CLOs), to improve the completeness and accuracy ofthe 
information which they collect and exchange. 
During  1994  and  1995  the  compliance  rate  for  recapitulative  statements  reached  95  % 
(number of statements  received  from  traders  compared  with  the  number  of statements 
estimated by  the  tax administrations to  be  due).  Over this  period,  I  ,5  %  of the  reported 
infonnationf:  could  not  be  exchanged  because  it  was· regarded  as  incorrect,  as  the 
purchaser's VAT identification number declared by the supplier did  not  correspond to  the 
rules governing construction of such numbers in  the Member State of the purchaser. 
Such rates of compliance and  accuracy arc a considerable and  \Velcome  improvement  on 
performance  in  the  early .months  of the  system  and  retlect  a  real  effort  on  the  part  of 
national  administrations  and  intra-Community  traders.  Nevertheless,  for  as  long  as  the 
data collected is  not complete and  accurate,  Member States must  do  all  in  their power to 
improve quality b)' streamlining their own management of their databases, sustained trader 
education and, where necessary, the application of penalties. 
1. J. 3.  (.'untro/ Liaison ( Hlin•s on~  I their mle in meeting dew/linus 
Regulation No  218/92 EEC provides for the setting up  in  each 1\rlember  State of a Central 
Liaison  Otlice  (CLO).  The  legislation  does  not  lay  down  detailed  requirements  for  the 
constitution of CLOs, but  at  a very early stage,  the  Commission  and  the  Member States 
agreed  a  set  of guidelines  setting  out  their  main  !tlllctinns  ;111d  objectives.  These  were 
principally to act as  the normal channel of communication between competent authorities: 
to manage the tlow of cooperation and  assistance between Membe'r States: to monitor the 
quality  and  pertinence  of requests  tor  assistance  and  of the  responses  to  them  and  to 
supervise  the  respect  of deadlines.  In  short,  the  CLO  should  act  as  a  single  point  of 
contact,  through  which  other Member States can  rely  on  obtaining etlcctive and  timely 
assistance with any  matters relating to  VAT control and  cooperation.  It  is  important  that 
CLOs should ha\'e the resources, powers and the e;-;pertise needed to provide that service  . 
.  \5.0110.000 Jines OJ' Cbi:J  \\'ere reporlcd by  illii';I-C'Oil\lllllllil~· snppJici'S. 
13 Article  5  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  21 8/92  states  that  "The  requested  authority  shall 
provide the information [requested by another Member State] as quickly as possible and  in 
any event no more than three months after receipt of  the request." No such deadline exists 
for  requests under Directive 77/799/EEC.  but  in  1994  the  SCAC  decided  that  requests 
made under Article 2 of the Directive would  be  subject  to  the  same tinie  limit  of three 
months which applies to requests made under Article  5 of the Regulation.  This decisio1i 
provided for  a streamlining of procedures applying in  Member States to the management 
of  requests and replies under the two legal bases. 
There has been a steady increase in  the number of requests made under these legal bases, 
as  can be  seen  from  figure  I  above.  This  increase  in  the  number of requests  made  has 
unfortunately been matched by a similar increase in the number of requests outstanding for 
which the  maximum 3  months deadline  has  expired.  The  Commission and  the  member 
States have been keeping a close watch on  these developments, both in  the SCAC and  in 
meetings of the Heads of CLO;  there  is  clearly  a danger that  an  unmanageable backlog 
could build up, to the detriment of  et1ective VAT control, if corrective action is  not taken 
in time. 
Figure 6: Propot·tion of overdue replies to requests under Art ide 5 of the .Regulation 
and Article 2 of the Directive outstanding as at 31  Decem her 1995 prr requested 
1\lrmhcr State 
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The problem of overdue replies is  pnrtly due  to  the  tact  that  requests are becoming ever 
more complex and accordingly take longer to  answer.  However, that tendency is  unlikely 
to  change  and  i\lember  States  must  take  account  of it  in  their  planning  In  practice, 
dit1crences  in  the organisation and  stat1ing  levels of CLOs between  Member States have 
led  to  a  variation  in  the  level  of ser\'ice  they  arc  able  to  provide  which  can  create 
dit1iculties  for  the  smooth  operation  of administrative  cooperation.  There  arc  strong 
indications that,  rather than acting as  a conduit, some CLOs at  least appear to be  causing 
bottlenecks in  communication as  can  be  seen  fi·om  figure  6 abo,·e.  A further  problem  is 
created in  certain ivlember States by  the  fact  that  dil1crent  parts of the administration are 
competent  in  respect  of VAT.  and  whilc·the  CLO  may  be  competent  f()r  dealing  with 
14 
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i  ,· requests under the Regulation, it  may not  be competent to  deal  with similar requests made 
under Directive 77/799/EEC.  In  the Commission's view,  this division of tasks undermines 
the  complementarity  which  is  explicitly  intended  in  the  Community  legislation.  It  also 
undermines the advantages that result tl·om having a single contact point. 
CLOs  will  only  be  able  to  provide  their  colleagues  in  other  Member  States  with  the 
service  which  they  expect  and  are  entitled  to  receive,  if they  can  secttre  an  adequate 
response,  in  terms  of allocation  of resources  and  priorities,  tl·om  their  own  control 
administration at  the appropriate level.  Member States which  do  not  reply to requests in 
time must empathise with the control otlicial in  the requesting Member State who may be 
depending on the reply to resolve a problem which  he  has encountered. Missed deadlines 
can lead to missed opportunities for etTective control and  recovery ofthe tax. 
Despite the  potential  improvements  identified  at  meetings  of the  heads  of CLOs,  held 
under  the  Matthaeus-Tax  programme,  these  organisational  and  stafting  differences  are 
continuing  to  hamper  the  development  of administrative  cooperation  and  need  to  be 
addressed by the rvrember States. 
In  particular, therefore, administrations need  to consider the adequacy of resources within 
CLOs;  the degree of priority given  at  local  level  to  requests  f()r  information  from  other 
Member States; the level  of human  resources assigned to such work  at  local  otlice level; 
the  requirements  for  training  in  the  use  of the  system  and  for  <111  understanding  of the 
needs  of other  Member  States;  and  language  training  to  overcome  communication 
difticulties. 
3.  CONCLUSIONS AND nECOi\li\IENDATIONS 
3.1.  Conclusions 
A  substantial  etTort  has  been  made  at  Community  level.  in  the  SCAC  and  in  periodic 
meetings of heads of national CLOs,  to monitor closely and  stimulate the development of 
administrative  cooperation.  These  etTorts  have  yielded  valuable  benefits.  Administrative 
cooperation  is  gradually  becoming  more  commonly  used;  a  number  of Member  States 
have  begun  to  integrate  it  into  their  national  control  strategy.  In  some  cases,  Member 
States have also  reinforced  their administrative structures to  meet  the increase in  demand 
which has taken place. 
15 The completeness and  accuracy of the  VIES data have significantly improved since  1993. 
Technically, the VIES has continued to function to a very high  standard.  It  offers fast  and 
secure access to large quantities of  data regularly collected ti·om  intra-Community traders. 
The  information  made  available  fulfils  a  real  control  need.  The  e~pansion  of the 
arrangements  to  implement  the  enlargement  of the  Community  in  1995  was  a  success 
from  the  technical  and  organisational  point  of view.  A  start  has  also  been  made  in 
promoting multilateral VAT control. 
However, in  spite of these improvements,  the situation  is  clearly not  satisfactory, even if 
that is to a large extent due to the taxation system itselfand to the shortcomings ofthe 6th 
VAT Directive. The differences in  its transposition and  application  by  the  Member States 
and the complexity of its rules are causing problems tor administrations and  traders alike 
and  the experience gained  during the  multilateral  VAT control experiments indicates that 
traders  are  exploiting  these  differences.  To  provide  a  solution  to  such  fundamental 
problems,  the  Commission  has  proposed  a complete  overhaul  of the  Community  VAT 
legislation9. 
Such a move will  not, however, happen overnight. And  in  a number of important respects,. 
there  is  still  a  great  deal  more  that  Member  States could  and  should  do  to  enable  the 
fullest  possible  benefit  to  be  drawn  ti·om  the  e:.:ist i  ng  Community  ti·amework.  As 
administrative co-operation becomes an  increasingly vital  lin!-:  in  the  VAT  control chain, 
failure  to  make  the  tlrllest  possible  use  of it  would  pose  an  unacceptable  threat  to  the 
integrity  of the  VAT system  itself  There  is  a  need  not  only  to  mal-:e  better use  of the 
possibilities otl'ercd  by  the existing ti·amcwork  but  also  to  construct a new  inti·astructure 
for  the  flmher  development  of the  tools  and  activities  needed  to  mal-:e  administrative 
cooperation  a  daily  reality  throughout  national  administrations.  As  a  first  stage  the 
Commission  will  shortly  be  putting  forward  a.  proposal  for  an  action  programme  to 
reinforce  the  tlmctioning  of the  indirect  taxation  systems  of the  internal  market.  This 
programme  will  also  provide  a  new  legal  and  budgetary  basis  for  Community  funding 
fi·om  1998  of the  VIES,  and  other  information  exchange  and  communication  systems 
necessary tor administrative cooperation. 
3.2.  Recommendations 
•  Member States must do  more to  ensure the fullest  possible integration of the control of 
the taxation of intra-Community  trade  into  their  national  VAT  control  strategies  and 
the  methodology  of all  their  control  stan:  rather  than  treating  it  as  a  specialist 
expertise. This entails giving a greater priority to the use of administrative cooperation 
A COIIIlllOII system or vAT - A progralllllle ror I  he Single 1\ larkct t  COt-vi(')(,) :;2x linal). 
1G •  To  this  end.  the  usc  of the  specific  enqui1y  and  request  opportumt1cs  provided  (at 
substantial  cost  to  traders and  national  administrations)  should  be  more  widespread. 
Similarly multilateral VAT controls - not just experiments. which  have already proved 
their worth.  but  real  operational  controls should  become a common  part of national 
control strategies. 
•  The Community,  in  partnership with the Member States, also  has  a dtlty to encourage 
the development of administrative co.operation.  More must  be done on  a Community 
level  and  in  the  Member States to  make  national  otlicials  aware  of the  Community 
dimension  of their  work;  to  foster  mutual  confidence  between  oflicials  of different 
national administrations; to  make coopemtion as  user-friendly and  low  in  oppol1lmity 
costs as possible. 
•  Member States must make greater efforts to ensure that all  their traders making intra-
Community  supplies  make  timely  and  correct  declarations.  and  must  reconsider  the 
adequacy of their enforcement and penalty policies for non-compliant traders. 
•  Member  States  must  invest  more  resources  to. enable  them  to  answer  requests  for 
assistance as soon as possible after they have been received from  other Member States. 
Organisational  and  statling  ditliculties  in  certain  CLOs  need  to  be  urgently  and 
vigorously addressed. 
•  Member States must commit themselves to pool information on concrete investigations 
of fraud  at  Community level.  Only  this  will  permit  the  development  of a Community 
strategy against fraud of any real  substance. 
•  The  Commission  and  Member  States  must  make  a  greater. etlort  to  increase 
cooperative activity  in  the  detection  and  prevention  of ti·aud.  The  lack  of complete 
information at  Community level  allied  to  the  limitations of the  existing ti·amework  t<.1r 
dealing with  complex transnational ti·aud  represents an  area of risk  that  must  be  faced 
up to. 
•  The Community will  need to take the necessa1y legislative and  administrative measures 
to  improve the arrangements for  administrative  cooperation  on  recovery.  These  will 
need  to  be  sustained  with  a  greater  effort  ti·om  the  Member  States  to  usc  the 
arrangements and fultil  their responsibilities under them. 
17 Cooperation  is  a  positive  sum game.  Eflective  action  by  all  Member  States  in  each  of 
these areas would  greatly enhance the ability of the  Community  as  a whole to  meet  the 
challenges facing  administrative cooperation,  both  now and  in  the years ahead.  With  the 
introduction  of the  new  common  VAT  system  for  the  single  market,  administrative 
cooperation  will. become  even  more  central  to  VAT  control.  A  level  of cooperation 
between  all the  Member  States  will  be  required,  at  least  equivalent  to  that  currently 
achieved within each Member State. It  is vital  that  the new  tools and  methodologies that 
will be needed should meet with a readiness on  the part of  all  Member States to use them 
together  ~mel to  integrate  the  Community  dimension  into  their  national  strategies.  The 
experience and achievements to date provide a firm  foundation to build on.  · 
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